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A Comparative Examination of the Role
of the Criminal Lawyer in Our
Present-Day Society
Harris B. Steinberg
More than a century ago, that astute observer of the American scene,
Alexis de Tocqueville, remarked that the lawyer was the closest approxi-
mation to an aristocrat to be found in the fledgling society emerging in
the New World.
Lawyers belong to the people by birth and interest, and to the aristocracy
by habit and taste; they may be looked upon as the connecting link
between the two great classes of society.
The profession of the law is the only aristocratic element that can be
amalgamated without violence with the natural elements of democracy
and be advantageously and permanently combined with them.'
At the time he wrote, the
THE AUTHOR (A.B., College of the City new nation had only recently
New York, LLB., Harvard University) is a been separated from the mother
practicing attorney in New York City. He has country. Indeed, the bar in
written articles for various legal periodicals and
is a past president of the National Association America consisted to a great ex-
of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases. He is tent of men who had learned
a member of the New York bar and a Fellow their law in England and who
of the American College of Trial lawyers. relied upon English precedents
in dealing with their cases. The
character of the American bar was naturally much like that of the Eng-
lish bar, and both were significantly different from the bars of other
countries.
This aristocratic character, which I hold to be common to the legal pro-
fession, is much more distinctly marked in the United States and Eng-
land than in any other country. This proceeds not only from the legal
studies of the English and American lawyers, but from the nature of
the law and the position which these interpreters of it occupy in the two
countries. The English and the Americans have retained the law of
precedents; that is to say, they continue to found their legal opinions
and the decisions of their courts upon the opinions and decisions of
their predecessors. In the mind of an English or American lawyer a
taste and a reverence for what is old is almost always united with a
love of regular and lawful proceedings.2
What was "old" and entitled to reverence, for both English and
American lawyers at the time was the set of firmly established liberties
1. 1 DE TocQuvILLn, DnmocRAcY iN AMuaRcA 276 (1946).
2. Ibid.
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contained in the Bill of Rights. The English also had just finished the
formulation of their police system, which was quite different from the
gendarmeries of the continental nations; it was one which scrupulously
respected the basic rights of the citizen. This was so only because the
citizen knew his rights, insisted that they be respected, and was truculently
ready to fight for them.
Power usually falls into the hands of those who love power, and it is
not in their nature to be benevolent. Peel's police had to be mild be-
cause it had to win the approval of the public. This was the reason
for the striking difference between the British police and all other
police forces at that time. Many of the gendarmeries had already found
that popular support was a desirable advantage; but to them it was never
a necessity. Ultimately they drew their strength from their power to
coerce. They could be lenient as and when it suited them, but in
the last resort they relied on being feared. The British police had to
be liked. Its very existence depended on this.3
The English - and their dose cousins, the Americans - chafed un-
der authoritarian restraint of any kind and resisted it aggressively when
it showed itself.
For all its many faults, pre-Victorian English society had one great
virtue; it hated discipline. Only such a society could have forced
Cromwell to abandon his military-police system, which if established
could so easily have survived the Restoration. Only such a society could
have thrown up the Fieldings and, where necessary, curbed their zeal.
Let us not forget that the traditional mildness of our police was won
by our ancestors not as a reward for being law-abiding, but as an
unavoidable concession to their hatred of constraint.4
The American bar of the early days of the republic played its part
sturdily and unhesitatingly when it became necessary to defend a citizen's
liberties. If lawyers were, as de Tocqueville observed, an aristocratic ele-
ment, they honored the maxim, "Noblesse oblige." In the celebrated case
of the British soldiers charged with murder in Massachusetts because of
the affray later known as the "Boston Massacre," John Adams and Josiah
Quincy, Jr., patriots and leaders of the Revolution, felt it to be their duty
to furnish legal counsel to the hated redcoats accused of murdering their
fellows. In a letter which is a great classic of the literature of the law,
young Quincy wrote to his alarmed and aged father that he would persist
in this highly unpopular cause because his duty as a lawyer required it.
I have little leisure, and less inclination, either to know or to take
notice of those ignorant slanderers who have dared to utter their "bitter
reproaches" in your hearing against me, for having become an advocate
for criminals charged with murder. But the sting of reproach, when
envenomed only by envy and falsehood, will never prove mortal. Be-
fore pouring their reproaches into the ear of the aged and infirm, if
3. PRINGLE, HUE AND CRY, THE BIRTH OF THE BRITISH POLICE 208 (1955).
4. PRINGLE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 209.
[Vol. 15:479
Steinberg, Role of the Criminal Lawyer
they had been friends, they would have surely spared a little reflection
on the nature of an attorney's oath and duties; - some trifling scrutiny
into the business and discharge of his office, and some small portion
of patience in viewing my past and future conduct.
Let such be told, Sir, that these criminals, charged with murder are not
yet legally proved guilty and therefore, however criminal, are entitled,
by the laws of God and Man, to all legal counsel and aid; that my duty
as a man obliged me to undertake; that my duty as a lawyer strength-
ened the obligation .... I dare affirm that you and this whole people
will one day REJOICE that I became an advocate for the aforesaid
"criminals" charged with the murder of our felow-citizens.5
For many years, this trait of readiness to spring to the defense of one
thought to be the victim of an injustice at the hands of the powerful,
heedless of the consequences to the lawyer himself, was a hallmark of the
American bar. In that touching and affectionate memoir which Bellamy
Partridge has given us of his father, a country lawyer practicing in up-
state New York shortly after the Civil War, he made particular note of
that quality in the lawyer.
Nothing so enraged my father as seeing the law used as an instrument
of injustice, and he would accept the case of the veriest old vagabond
against the mightiest if he thought there was any chance to uncover
what he called "facial piety" on the part of the higher ups. He took
particular delight in unmasking anything that had even a faint aroma of
persecution, an attitude which first and last must have cost him no
small amount of business.6
In the cities, too, no less than in the smaller communities, this willing-
ness to tilt a lance for principle was a characteristic of the American bar
of the last century. The late Judge James Garrett Wallace, in his In-
troduction to Rovere's Howe & Hummel, Their True and Scandalous His-
tory, noted that it was a group of leading lawyers in New York who rose
against and slew the noisome dragon, the Tweed Ring.
In 1871, the Tweed Ring was exposed by public-spirited -citizens, urged
on by The New York Times and Harpers Weekly, which carried
Thomas Nast's devastating cartoons. The City Bar Association was
formed to fight the ring. It was led by a valiant fighter for civic
decency, Samuel J. Tilden, aided by William M. Evarts, Joseph Choate,
and others. The efforts of these and other citizens resulted in the in-
dictment and conviction in 1873 of Tweed, Connolly, and others, the
emergence of Tilden as a great political figure, and the election of Wil-
liam L. Strong, a reform mayor, in 1894.7
Nor was the role of these big city leaders of the bar confined to corpo-
rate and civil matters when they turned from their civic efforts to the
practice of law; it was considered not at all unusual for these men to
appear for the defense in criminal cases from time to time.
5. Quincy, Memoir, 14 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 154 (1959).
6. PAPTRmGE, CouNTRY LAWYER 227 (1939).
7. RovRE, HowE & HAMMLL, THEIR TRuE AND SCANDALOUs HIsToRY 6 (1947).
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In the courts, many lawyers of the first rank appeared for defendants
in criminal cases. Practice in the criminal courts was not avoided by
the leaders of the Bar, as it is today. The trial lawyer, not the corpora-
tion lawyer, was the important figure in those days.'
DECLINE OF THE CRIMINAL BAR
But in more recent times this picture has changed quite radically.
The advent of "Prohibition" and the public's horrified and disgusted view
of the attendant violence and corruption probably marked the final turn-
ing point. The criminal bar, in numbers, effectiveness, and public esteem,
seems to have taken a steep drop at that time. In 1953, when Professor
Richard B. Morris wrote Fair Trial, which told the stories of fourteen
notable American trials over a long span of years, he was impelled to
note that "it is scarcely a matter of dispute that the quality of the criminal
bar has in fact seriously deteriorated in recent generations."'
The rise of political machines in big cities around the turn of the cen-
tury was often accompanied by seduction of the machinery of criminal
justice. The autocratic leader of a machine often enriches himself and
his associates, at least in part, from the proceeds of organized illegal
gambling and vice. It needs little foresight to decide to lend safety to
the enterprise by installing complaisant judges and prosecutors in office
who will not interrupt the smooth and profitable functioning of the
status quo. Conditions like these furnished scant impetus or encourage-
ment for able young men to become involved in such distasteful doings.
The best known and most influential lawyers were also drawn away from
litigation to the greater rewards attendant on practice in the growing
fields of corporate, business, and tax matters. The changing nature of
American society furnished a challenge which drew many of our best men
to practice which involved the problems of big business. Dean Eugene
V. Rostow, of Yale Law School, points out that this direction of the
American bar is not necessarily to be decried.
A comparison of the professional position of the lawyer in Britain and
in the United States illuminates several problems which we should face,
and solve, within the pattern of our own history. In defining these
problems, we should accept the present functions of the lawyer in our
complex society, and particularly those of the specialist in business and
corporate law, as necessary and desirable. They represent a creative
response to the special circumstances of American life. At its best, as
Mr. Justice Brandeis once said, the role of the American corporation
lawyer is an influence in the direction of professionalizing business.
At its worst, to recall Chief Justice Stone's warning, it is a factor
tending to commercialize the profession of law.10
8. RovEaR, op. cit. supra note 7, at 14.
9. MoRRis, FAIR TRIAL XV (1952).
10. Morrison Lecture by Dean Rostow before the Connecticut State Bar Association, October,
1961.
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Whether or not the American society is well served in the area of
corporate and business law because of the attractions of those fields for
our most brilliant legal minds, it is dear that we have suffered in the
area of civil rights and civil liberties by virtue of the attrition of the trial
bar. Comparison of the situation here in the past few decades with that
prevailing in England brings this into focus.
Developments in England
In England, it has always been true that an able and respected lawyer
can invariably be found for every defendant in a criminal case. Even
defendants without funds can be sure of a well-conducted defense through
the help of the legal aid system. In this country, the availability of de-
fense lawyers in criminal cases has been so sparse that the recent decision
of the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright,/ enforcing the constitu-
tional right to counsel in state courts, has thrown our bar into a tremen-
dous upheaval. The necessity of finding adequate numbers of lawyers
able to try criminal cases has posed a problem of major proportions, to
which no ready solution appears.
Several reasons suggest themselves for the widening cleavage between
the English and the American societies with respect to the manner in
which they have developed. Starting from a common heritage, what
was until a few decades ago a common way of conducting the business
of the administration of criminal justice has been split into two systems
with significant differences of substance.
In the first place, the English have continued their division of the
law profession into two separate branches, barristers and solicitors. The
barrister is the trial lawyer. He is a member of a priestly caste, proud of
his ancient forebears in the Inns of Court. The number of active prac-
ticing barristers only approximates 2,200. The respect in which they
are held has been safeguarded by rigid customs of holding themselves
aloof from the process of gathering evidence, interviewing witnesses, the
setting of fees, and all matters which could conceivably expose them to
the claims of soliciting business or suborning untruths.
True, the barristers are outnumbered almost ten to one by the solici-
tors who handle office work, commercial clients, tax matters, conveyanc-
ing, and advice on daily affairs. The average solicitor, however, makes
a great deal more money than the average barrister. Again, the Eng-
lish judiciary is chosen from the ranks of the best barristers, regardless of
political considerations. A man who aspires to the bench must win the
favorable opinion of his knowledgeable fellows by being a good lawyer.
He need not seek the approval of political machines, as in America,
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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where the judge's robe is too often the reward for services having little to
do with legal merit or integrity.
The public, too, is proud of its barristers, and would never think of
attributing to one of them the faults of his client or the hatefulness of
the client's cause. They know that a barrister does not pick and choose
his cases, but that he is in honor bound to take any case offered to him
with a proper fee. This "cab rank" principle is at the root of the law-
yer's ability to dissociate himself in the public eye from his client's un-
popularity and the heinousness of the charge. The rule was recently dis-
cussed by Lord Shawcross, in his capacity as Chairman of the General
Council of the Bar, in the following terms:
I have recently heard it said, although I believe incorrectly said, that
certain members of the Bar in one of Her Majesty's Colonies refused
to accept a brief to defend an African, accused of offenses of a quasi-
political nature against public order. The suggestion is that those bar-
risters made excuses and declined to act, their true reason being they
thought that their popularity or reputation might be detrimentally af-
fected by appearing for the defence in such a case. For the prosecu-
tion they might appear, but not for the defence.
I believe this report is incorrect. I profoundly hope it is, for if it were
true it would disclose a wholly deplorable departure from the great
traditions of our law and one which, if substantiated, both the Attor-
ney-General and the Bar Council, of which I happen to be chairman,
would have to deal with in the severest possible way.
It remained true that among laymen on both sides of politics there were
some foolish and shortsighted enough to think that a barrister might,
and should, pick and choose the cases in which he was prepared to ap-
pear. Socialist lawyers had been thus subjected to bitter attack in
Communist organs and by fellow travellers who did not like the sub-
ject-matter of cases in which those lawyers had been briefed to appear
or the politics of the clients who might have retained them.
It would be well if those gentry remembered how the present rule -
that a barrister must accept a brief on behalf of any client who wished
to retain him to appear before any court in which he held himself out
to practise - was finally established. It arose in 1792 over the prose-
cution of Tom Paine for publishing the second part of his Rights of
Man. The great advocate Erskine, who accepted the retainer to defend
Paine, and was deprived of his office as Attorney-General to the Prince
of Wales for doing so, said - and said truly - in a famous speech:
"From the moment that any advocate can be permitted to say that he
will or will not stand between the Crown and the subject arraigned in
the court where he daily sits to practise, from that moment the liberties
of England are at an end.' 2
Two more significant aspects of English practice remain to be dis-
cussed in this connection. One is the firm restraint against any intru-
sions by the press on the process of justice. Newspaper, television, or
radio reports which contain matter prejudicial to the fair trial of a crimi-
nal defendant will result in the prompt jailing of the offending publisher
12. The Times (London), Feb. 19, 1953, p. 4, col. 3.
[Vol. 15:479
Steinberg, Role of the Criminal Lawyer
for contempt of court As a result, the public is not titillated or aroused
to a lynch-mob fervor by gory details of crimes, the minutiae of confes-
sions, prior criminal records of defendants, or editorials demanding "jus-
tice" while the case remains at issue. The second aspect is that there is
no permanent cast of characters in a continuing morality play - the
"good guys" against the "bad guys." There is no permanent official
prosecutor, who appears always in the role of avenger of the oppressed
victim of crime and who often seeks higher office on the strength of his
appeal as a prosecutor; there is no complaisant grand jury to hand down
"presentments" drawn up by the prosecutor's public relations officer; and
the defense lawyer is not always on that denigrated side. In short, the
system whereby a barrister for the prosecution and a barrister for the
defense are briefed separately in each case results in consideration of the
barrister as a cooperative part of the machinery of justice, rather than as
a symbolic protagonist for good or for evil.
Recent American Developments
Let us contrast these conditions, which result from following the
straight line of logical developments stemming from the Great Charter
and the Bill of Rights, with those which obtain in our own country.
In America, there is, of course, no division into barristers and solid-
tors. We have already adverted to the fact that the more knowledgeable
and able a lawyer is, the more nimbly he is likely to skip to the kind of
work which will take him as far from the criminal law as possible. In-
evitably, the moneyed society of which we are a part will offer to the
lawyer enticing social and monetary incentives which will take him away
from the trial court and point him toward serving business clients. The
standards of the bar will be influenced by its leaders, and if those leaders
are closely attuned to the thinking and attitudes of businessmen, they
will reflect those attitudes in their dealings with their brethren at the
criminal trial bar. The pecking order is never in doubt; the absence of
a separate barristers' group, with its own traditions and standards, leaves
the trial lawyer to an appraisal by others unsympathetic to his aims and
his problems.
Second, our judiciary is chosen, not as in England on the strength
of performance at the bar after appraisal by a lawyer's colleagues, but
by such irrational systems as general elections and politically inspired ap-
pointment by executives who must seek election. One is infinitely more
likely to find a prosperous lawyer without trial expereince but with long
political service chosen for the bench than to see a criminal lawyer for
the defense chosen for such a post. Since many lawyers have the bench
as their ultimate ambition, this situation acts as a further deterrent to
the choice of criminal law as a career.
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Third, the "cab rank" principle alluded to above does not obtain
here. The American lawyer has maintained his freedom to pick and
choose cases; it may well be a most illusory freedom, more binding than
slavery. Even so well-known a trial lawyer as Louis Nizer was reported
in the Harvard Law School Record of March 7, 1963, as saying that no
ethical canon required him to represent a man for whom he could not
argue with conviction. He stated that he was "unable to fragment his
emotions in order to represent a Communist or some other man he
despises." If this be so, who will be found to take the causes or clients
who are justly looked on with revulsion and loathing? Why should a
lawyer take on the defense of a Communist, a narcotics peddler, or a
sexual pervert, if he is free to reject it? Is not the public justified in be-
lieving that a man who does so is motivated either by greed for money
or by a sympathy for the things represented by the defendant? The at-
tendant fears and confusions which lurk around these questions have all
but deprived the "unpopular" client of a defense in this country.
Fourth, the press and other mass media of information are complete-
ly untrammeled in their reporting of news concerning criminal cases.
Often a fair trial is impossible. A sobering recent example of the ex-
tremes to which this sort of thing can be carried are the sad events in
Dallas which followed President Kennedy's assassination. The pressures
built up by this type of intrusion on the concept of a fair trial are perva-
sive in their effect. Elected judges and prosecutors rarely have the cour-
age to take a firm stand against what the public, as represented by the
press, seems to want. The trial lawyer is either a willing performer, add-
ing to the unseemliness, or a curmudgeon charged with seeking to keep
the truth from the world if he attempts to adhere to the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics.
Finally, the permanent separation of the protagonists in the criminal
trial into two camps - elected prosecutors, who are always on the prose-
cuting side, and defense lawyers who are always for the defense - makes
it easy for the unthinking to equate the two sides with "right" and
"wrong," respectively. The growing tendency to identify lawyers with
their causes intensifies the feeling that a defense lawyer probably must
socialize with his clients, as the laymen knows his own business lawyer
does. The consequent mental picture of a defense lawyer, roistering on
an expense account with gangsters and their molls, is hard to erase when
one acts as a juror or reads a newspaper account of a case. An added
factor contributing to the cleavage is the fact that the prosecutor's office
is often the best stepping-stone to higher elective office. Realizing this.
many of them seek to stay constantly in the public eye, with statements
and releases about pending cases, investigations, grand jury presentments,
and statistics of law enforcement and convictions.
[VoL 15:479
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POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS
It is not strange that, as we regress from good practice in our deal-
ings with criminal justice, certain unreal or mythic ideas should be widely
held by the public. One of the questions most often heard by a criminal
lawyer is, "How can you bring yourself to represent a man you know to
be guilty?" Many thoughtful lawyers have given answers to this ques-
tion. Suffice it to say here simply that our system requires that a man
charged with crime is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty;
that it is not the lawyer's job to judge his client, but to defend him and
see that his rights are accorded him. These are, admittedly, abstract con-
cepts, not easy for laymen to grasp and respect. The hard facts of ruth-
less crimes and the bleeding wounds and cries of anguished and bereft
victims are easier to understand; they unloose revengeful passions and
emotions not lightly to be dealt with by reciting abstractions. But con-
trary to such ringing catch phrases as "crusades against crime" and "wars
on racketeers," the business of justice is neither a crusade nor a war. It
is, on the contrary, an attempt to bring calm and dispassionate reasoning
to the solution of difficult problems; it is a peaceful skill, rather than
a warlike one or a substitute for war. Objectivity on the part of the law-
yer is a desideratum. Lord Shawcross, in his Cardozo lecture at the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of The City of New York, spoke as follows:
I have... always found it best to avoid forming any personal opinion
on the merits of cases I have dealt with. Eventually that becomes
rather a habit of mind. Of course, that may mean that one lacks the
enthusiasm of an advocate firmly convinced that his cause is just:
it also protects one from despair or hypocrisy when we feel the oppo-
site.13
The most mischievous piece of folklore which obscures the true func-
tion of a criminal lawyer is the more basic misconception about the true
function of a criminal trial. One often hears the magniloquent phrase,
"A trial is a search for the truth." If it is really a search for the truth,
and if the ascertainment of truth is the principal purpose of a trial, one
can understand the reluctance of some lawyers to be on the "wrong" or
"untruthful" side. It does seem logical to feel uneasy at being allied
with a client who has the worst of it in anything so noble as a search
for the truth. Can it be considered proper work for an honest advocate
to make it his business to urge technicalities which get in the way of
ascertaining the truth? Are not the presumption of innocence and the
fifth amendment really only moves in a rather unreal game designed to
obscure the truth, rather than to reveal it?
A policeman or an aggrieved victim of a crime may say, with some
13. Shawcross, The Functions and Responsibilities of an Advocate, REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
483, 502 (1958).
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justification, that it is certainly a queer kind of search for the truth which
bars, at the outset, compelling the defendant to tell what he knows;
certainly he knows more about the case than anyone else. It is a strange
kind of search for the truth when you have absolutely incontrovertible
evidence of what really happened, but you are barred from adducing
it because you obtained it by breaking into the defendant's home without
a warrant. Is it not at odds with a dedicated search for the truth to pro-
hibit tapping a man's wire to hear him plotting with his confederates?
The answer, it seems, lies in the fact that in our society we believe
that an individual's human dignity, his right to be treated as a person
of consequence, and his right to be treated as an individual rather than
as part of an undifferentiated mass are important. Thus, we willingly
have eschewed ways of learning the truth about a happening which are
destructive of that dignity and human integrity. We no longer torture
people to induce them to confess. Yet we know that for many centuries
and in many lands torture has been used for that purpose. We do not
stretch a man out on a table and inject truth serum into his veins or
force him to take lie detector tests; yet we know that in some parts of
the world that is a common practice. Other societies do not hesitate
to do so, but it is precisely in that difference in respect for individual
rights that we believe the superiority of our system lies. We firmly hold
to the idea that it is less important to learn the objective factual truth
about a happening, no matter how bad that act was, than to adopt
methods of gathering facts which will lead us to live in suspicion, fear,
distrust, and degradation. It may not be getting at the truth when a
man who has committed a crime is let off scot-free, but it is good sound
justice to throw out a case where the very persons charged, under oath,
to uphold the Constitution and the laws have themselves violated it and
disrespected it.
Dean Thayer of Harvard Law School said it well many years ago
when he wrote:
In dealing with litigation courts are not engaged in an academic exer-
cise; with them the search for truth is not the main matter. Their de-
sire to know this and their ability to use it are limited by the require-
ments of their main business, that of awarding justice.
Our common law system, over a thousand years, has evolved certain
rules and rituals which have proved themselves empirically, to be sound.
The rules of evidence may sometimes work to exclude testimony which
is "truthful," but experience has taught us that in the great majority of
cases they work well, and that they serve the cause of justice acceptably.
It is the lawyer's function or role in our society to serve the cause
of justice by wholeheartedly accepting the defense of a person charged
with crime and asserting every defense in his behalf which is available to
[Vol 15:479
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him. He serves the system of justice in doing so, even more directly
than he serves the individual client's interests; Important though the
latter assignment may be, it is only made possible by acknowledging the
greater importance of the former.
It is well to keep in mind that our system of justice and all of our
beautifully phrased rights which appear in the Constitution and statute
books do not work automatically. It requires the cooperative interaction
of a complex cast of characters, an indispensable one of which is the
defense lawyer committed as an antagonist to insure that those rights
will live and be meaningful.
Another misconception often encountered is the attitude that true
justice is to be achieved by an inflexible and uniform application of the
rules to all people - "rich and poor alike." If that be truly the ideal,
then the interposition of a hired champion to plead for leniency or to
seek to avoid the consequences of one's acts seems rather unworthy and
anti-social. Professor Edmund Cahn, in his stimulating book, The Sense
of Injustice, provides a good answer to those who question a lawyer's
role in this regard:
The standards of law provide our best pragmatic technique by which
arrogant administrators and executives can be called to book. And
when, on the other hand, legal rules are to be applied to the lowly,
there is at least a modicum of discretion available to magistrates, juries,
policemen, commissioners, and state's attorneys. General rules need
not decide deviant particular cases, unless officials are dogmatic, stupid,
corrupt or inhumane. For, to the sense of injustice, an individual's
peculiar qualities may be empathized as a constituent part of his pre-
dicament and thus they may influence the determination of his desert.
We cannot abandon the conceptual man without jeopardizing many of
the freedoms that the past has won. But the conceptual man is never
quite the one in the prisoner's dock. The latter is as God and society
have made him, with such alterations as he himself has been able to
furnish. The composite impression conveyed by al the circumstances
can sway the judge and the jury when they come to their final apprecia-
tion of his case. Then it is that a rule of law and a list of facts must
be chosen conformably to the general denouement which is felt to bejust. So as long as the sense of injustice proffers its imaginative inter-
change, law may be conformed in its individual applications to many
if not all the special needs of nonconformists.14
The foregoing rather bleak appraisal of the extent to which the role
of the criminal defense lawyer has deteriorated over the years is tempered
by a number of recent developments which, hopefully, may reverse the
trend.
Among them are the landmark decisions in Mapp v. Ohio,'5 and
Gideon v. Wainwright.6  Mapp, of course, held that evidence obtained
14. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INjUSTiCE, AN ANTHROPOCENTRc ViEw OF LAt 162-63
(1949).
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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in an illegal search and seizure may not be received in a state criminal
trial. This had always been true in the federal jurisdiction," but many
states had followed the rule of People v. Defore,"8 which held that such
evidence would be admitted since the relevance of the evidence required
its receipt, while the illegality involved in obtaining it would have to be
dealt with in collateral proceedings such as a civil suit against the of-
fending officer. The trend of state court decisions had been away from
the Defore case, and Mapp v. Ohio dealt the doctrine a final blow. Ker
v. California,9 in 1963, held that the body of federal law and standards
developed in administering the federal doctrine of exclusion was im-
ported into the state court administration of the Mapp decision.
There is ground for believing that the Mapp decision, in addition to
being good public policy and good constitutional law, would not hamper
a well-trained police force in its work. Thus, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, as well as other federal agencies which are compelled to
work under the exclusionary rule, have compiled a creditable record of
effectiveness despite the strictures of the rule.
But state and city police forces which had never bothered with search
warrants or other constitutional safeguards, secure in the knowledge that
Defore's doctrine made warrants a technicality which could be winked
at with impunity, have been seriously discountenanced by the new rule.
The reaction was a predictable one. Instead of welcoming an affirma-
tion of an important constitutional right and turning promptly to the
task of training police officers in the law which they are sworn to uphold
and obey, the outcry was against the strictures of the new law. Attempts
to avoid it have taken many forms.
Interesting are a number of laws adopted recently by the New York
Legislature at the urging of law enforcement agencies. One permits
stopping of persons on the street and "frisking" them in a search for
weapons on mere suspicion. The law reads as follows:
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place
whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about
to commit a felony or any of the crimes specified in section five
hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police office has stopped a person for questioning pur-
suant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life
or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the po-
lice officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession of
which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the com-
pletion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if
lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.20
17. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
18. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
19. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
20. N.Y. CODE CIUM. PROC. § 180-a (effective July 1, 1964).
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Another, section 791 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure,
effective July 1, 1964, provides that search warrants shall issue not only
for well-understood categories of property subject to seizure, such as stolen
or embezzled property, contraband, or instrumentalities of crime, but for
evidence as well: "4. Property constituting evidence of crime or tending
to show that a particular person committed a crime."'"
It remains to be seen whether such attempts to avoid a constitutional
mandate by a statute directly at odds with it will be deemed effective
when the courts consider them. While this author is of the opinion that
they are unconstitutional, the aspect of these acts to which attention
should be drawn is the nature of the public response to the publicized
wholesale freeing of defendants under the Mapp case ruling because the
rights of those defendants had been violated. Instead of demanding
prompt police reform to prevent the freeing of guilty men because of the
"constable's blunder," the anger and fear of the populace has been di-
rected at the Constitution, the Supreme Court which interpreted it, and
the lawyers who espouse defendants' causes.
During "Prohibition" days, the wholesale liberation of defendants be-
cause of illegal searches and seizures had similarly aroused public reaction
against the Constitution.
In 1925, so thoughtful and able a judge as Judge John Knox, of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
spoke at the Association of the Bar of The City of New York, and
launched a strong attack upon the Fourth Amendment. He said, 'The
Fourth Amendment is a terrible stumbling block in the way of justice.'
If this sounds surprising from such a source, we ought, in fairness, to
examine the surrounding circumstances. Judge Knox had then had almost
a decade of service on the District Court. Prohibition was in force.
Gangsterism, bootlegging, corruption and racketeering were rife. Every-
where, agents were breaking into homes and places of business, without
proper warrants, finding illegal liquor, yet cases were thrown our, be-
cause of violation of the Fourth Amendment. In despair at what he
felt were frequently unjustified verdicts, and results which protected
the guilty people, the judge spoke. The fact that a trained, intelligent
person felt that way (no doubt mirroring the feelings of many respect-
able people) at that time, shows that there is a certain virtue in the
long-rang view when we deal with basic constitutional safeguards. It
was far wiser to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment than the Fourth.
But most important, it shows us that governmental abuses of a basic
right may stir up a great deal of resentment, not against the abuse, but
against the unpopular person who stands in the way of that abuse, and
claims his rights. 22
Other examples of dark periods in our recent history, when the asser-
tion of a constitutional right called down the opprobrium on the heads of
21. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 791 (effective July 1, 1964).
22. Steinberg, A Re-Examination of The Fifth Amendment, N.Y.S.B. BULL. 230, 233-34
(1959).
1964]
"WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the persons properly claiming the right, rather than on those who deni-
grated the right, are found in the McCarthy Committee hearings of evil
fame, and, more recently, in televised Congressional hearings where wit-
nesses were repeatedly forced to claim their privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in public.
But what do they [the Senatorial Committee conducting hearings] add
to the efficacy of their job when they learn, at private preliminary hear-
ings, that a prospective witness, whose misdeeds will be the subject of
a public hearing, intends validly to daim his privilege, but nevertheless
insist on his appearance, and the public claim of privilege? Again,
what purpose is served by asking that witness a score, two score, or a
hundred questions, knowing in advance that every one will be answered
by a claim of privilege? Certainly, the committee learns nothing from
the witness. If the witness' misdeeds are relevant, they are usually docu-
mented from other sources.
On the other hand, what do we lose from such a procedure? Wide-
spread publicity, motion pictures, television broadcasting, bring home to
the lay public that A has claimed his privilege 197 times, or 215
times, that he read his statement monotonously from a paper prepared
by a lawyer, and thus he has thwarted the government. The more times
the privilege was claimed, the greater the criminality; the more times
he asserted his undoubted rights, the more vicious the man. Ergo, let
us do away with the privilege, so we will have no more such unedifying
scenes. This is a dangerous logic. Much more valid, it seems to me, is
the conclusion that if a man has a right, and we know that he intends
properly to assert it, we should not force him to assert it, and thereby
impugn not only his own integrity, but the rights of all of us. I would
hope that now, five years after the turmoil of the McCarthy hearings,
in quieter retrospect, we have learned the lesson that self-restraint,
in matters like this, better serves the public interest in the long run
than heated, sensational dramatics.2 3
It is to be hoped that the tensions and uncertainties which require
resolution in the wake of the Mapp case will not start a trend toward ill-
advised panaceas which must inevitably fail, and, in their failure, call
forth even more fear and anger. A nation which does not welcome the
responsibilities and benefits of freedom is one which can easily lose its
freedom.
CONCLUSION
During our recent history, certain overwhelming events have made
their effects felt so shatteringly and so swiftly as to leave us wandering,
dazed, and uncomprehending for a time before we were able to adjust to
them. Such is the impact of automation on a multitude of confortably-
situated wage earners suddenly made excess. Such is the emergence of
the atom bomb as a weapon and as a looming threat over life itself. Such
was the abolition of the long-time acceptance that men with dark skins
23. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 234-35.
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may be discriminated against with impunity. Such, it is submitted, is
the effect of Gideon v. Wainwright and the other threads in the shining
fabric which our Supreme Court has woven in the past decade. We stand
on the threshold of a new era in our history of civil rights and constitu-
tional liberties. A golden vista of a society where every man is impor-
tant, regardless of race, color, or religion, stretches before us for the tak-
ing. Not only is it offered, it is accompanied by an imperious command
that it must be taken.
The priests in the old temple of justice, which was a flourishing in-
stitution in this country a century ago, and which is still a healthy one in
England, come blinking out into the clear light of a new dawn. They
are old, they are too few in number, they are often understandably dis-
couraged, and for some generations their religious fervor, their standing
in the community, and the purity of their rites and practices may have
suffered. But they must be the nucleus for a strong, widespread effort
by the entire bar to fulfill the duties enjoined on us by Gideon (an ap-
propriate name, if we hark back to the Biblical story).
Civil trial lawyers will have to take their part in the administration
of criminal justice; legal aid societies and public defenders will have to
be organized and staffed with able, dedicated, young people. All varieties
of part-time and experimental expedients will have to be tried. But we
have no choice but to provide every man accused of crime with a compe-
tent lawyer ready to defend him, and to take an appeal if necessary. The
criminal lawyer should welcome the challenge of the new colleagues and
the new rivals. Higher standards will inevitably prevail as interest,
talent, and dedication are added to the presently available inadequate
forces. The criminal lawyer can either increase his skills and share those
he has with the new men, or he will be left behind, grumbling, shaken,
and telling of the "old days" to an unheeding world.
For all who take part in the new situation there is the exciting and
heartening knowledge that they are the direct legatees of a great heritage.
Let us not forget that John Peter Zenger's case, and the Tennessee
monkey trial, and the Southern sit-in cases, and every case which has
established a landmark in our fight for civil liberties and constitutional
guaranties were criminal cases. 24
It is unthinkable that we will not be equal to the challenge posed by
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
A good trial does not take place at will or in a void. It is the product
of a community, its customs, its habits of thought and feeling, and of
men - ultimately, a handful of men: the prosecuting attorneys and de-
24. Steinberg, The Responsibility of the Defense Lawyer in Criminal Cases, 12 SYRAcusE
L. REv. 442, 447 (1961).
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fense attorneys, their hand-picked juries, and the judge. Men -
within limits - can rise to great occasions. So, there is still cause for
hope, though the first stages have not been propitious.2 5
So wrote Sybille Bedford, a sensitive and profound English observer, au-
thor of The Trial of Dr. Adams and The Faces of Justice, when she came
to Dallas to report the Ruby trial for Life Magazine. Perhaps this hope
was disappointed in a specific case; it is our job to make it generally valid
in the future.
25. Life, Feb. 28, 1964, p. 36.
